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Notice to Decedents' Creditors
Thomas L. Waterbury*
In 1950, the United States Supreme Court decided Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.1 Mullane invalidated a
New York statute that permitted a common trust fund trustee
to secure judicial approval of its accounts 2 in a proceeding of
which trust beneficiaries were given notice merely by publica-
tion.3 The Court explicitly confined the holding of Mullane to
trust beneficiaries who were identified in the trustee's current
records. The Court held that such beneficiaries were at least
entitled, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, to be notified of the accounting proceeding by ordinary
mail.4
Mullane is better known, however, for Justice Jackson's
general description of the notice requirement of the due pro-
cess clause, a description not confined to the rights of known
parties with known addresses:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. A number of
lawyers from several states, both law teachers and practitioners, have contrib-
uted valuable comments and information during the preparation of this Arti-
cle. Special thanks are due to the following: Professor Daniel A. Farber of
the University of Minnesota Law School provided a critique of due process as-
pects; Professor Philip P. Frickey of the University of Minnesota Law School
provided helpful comments on the same subject; Jerry G. Dygert, Esq., of Min-
neapolis, and William J. Berens, Esq., of Minneapolis, contributed critiques of
the legislative proposals, which led to significant revisions; and Professor Rich-
ard V. Wellman's skeptical critique of several of my arguments helped me to
improve them. Shortcomings that remain are my responsibility.
Thanks also are due my former research assistant Andrea Walsh, Esq., of
Minneapolis, and my research assistants Amy KvMseth and Arlene Kelly, of
the University of Minnesota Law School's class of 1989, for their valuable
contributions.
1. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2. The judicial approval purportedly bound all trust beneficiaries. Id at
309.
3. Id. at 320 (discussing N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-C (1944)).




This general description suggests that "interested parties" who
are not known also may be entitled to such notice. Mullane did
not address the subject of what kind of search for such people
due process would require.
Many state probate codes, however, long have authorized
one or both of two procedures under which courts may deter-
mine the respective rights of successors and creditors of dece-
dents without meeting the Mullane notice requirements. 6 One
such procedure is the informal or "common form" probate 7 of a
will without notice to possible successors." The other is the
widespread practice of barring the claims of a decedent's credi-
tors under a two- to six-month short-term9 nonclaim statute.10
Under a short-term nonclaim statute, a decedent's creditors'
claims will be subject to a statute of limitations period triggered
by publication of a notice to creditors. 1 Unsurprisingly then,
5. Id. at 314.
6. Some probate codes authorize both procedures. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 28-40-111 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
7. The English ecclesiastical courts permitted "common form" probate of
a testament of personalty without notice, (although interested parties could
require a supplemental "solemn form" proceeding with notice to interested
parties for an extended period, perhaps as long as 30 years. T. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 93, at 482 (2d ed. 1953)). A similar infor-
mal probate proceeding without notice has been available in "more than a
third" of the states. Id. § 95, at 494. This form of proceeding remains available
in many of them. W. MCGOVERN, S. KURTZ & J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ES-
TATES § 14.1, at 578 (1988) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-601, 113-602 (currently
codified at 53-3-8 to -9 (Supp. 1988))). Under typical American versions, the
informal proceeding becomes final after one to several years. Id.
The Uniform Probate Code contains its own version of informal probate
without notice. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-301, 3-306 (1988). The Code bars claim-
ants seeking to recover assets from informal distributees at the later of three
years following the date of the decedent's death or one year following the date
of informal distribution. Id. § 3-1006.
8. Under these statutes, a party may contest a will admitted to probate
without notice for one or more years thereafter. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-
3-12 (Supp. 1988) (informal probate bars interested parties after four years).
9. This term, which was coined by Professor Falender, refers to a statute
that bars claims of a decedent's creditors who fail to present their claims
against the estate within two to six months following the issuance of letters to
a decedent's personal representative and the publication of a notice that such
letters have been issued. Falender, Notice To Creditors In Estate Proceedings:
What Process Is Due?, 63 N.C.L. REV. 659, 667-69 (1985).
10. For a general description of nonclaim statutes, see T. ATKINSON, supra
note 7, § 127, at 690-91.
11. Section 3-801 of the Uniform Probate Code, for example, provides as
follows:
Unless notice has already been given under this section, a personal
representative upon his appointment shall publish a notice once a
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one early consequence of the Mullane decision was scholarly
debate as to whether such provisions violated due process no-
tice requirements.1
Many state appellate courts wholly rejected arguments that
the informal probate of a will without notice1 3 or the barring of
a decedent's creditors following notice by publication under a
short-term nonclaim statute14 violates the due process require-
ments articulated in Mullane. Moreover, the Supreme Court,
although willing to apply Mullane expansively in other areas,
15
bolstered the authority of these state court decisions by dis-
missing appeals from state court proceedings that upheld both
types of statutes. 16 Perhaps in partial reliance on such prece-
dents, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included pro-
week for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the [county] announcing his appointment and address and notifying
creditors of the estate to present their claims within 4 months after
the date of the first publication of the notice or be forever barred.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-801 (1988). Section 3-803(a)(1) provides as follows:
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivi-
sion thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devi-
sees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) within 4 months after the date of the first publication of no-
tice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with Section 3-
801; provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the dece-
dent's domicile before the first publication for claims in this state
are also barred in this state.
(2) within [3] years after the decedent's death, if notice to credi-
tors has not been published.
1d. § 3-803(a)(1) (emphasis added).
12. Thus Atkinson, in the 1953 edition of his treatise on wills, observed
that "[s]ome question has been raised" as to whether the probate of a will
without notice violates Mullane's notice requirements. T. ATKINSON, supra
note 7, at § 95, 494 n.26 (citing Comment, 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951); Levy,
Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Pro-
bate Proceedings, 1952 Wisc. L. REV. 420).
13. See, e.g., Haas v. Haas, 504 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Mo. 1973), appeal dismissed,
417 U.S. 928 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 151 Mont. 526, 529, 445 P.2d
574, 576 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 530 (1969); Continental Coffee Co. v.
Estate of Clark, 84 Nev. 208, 213, 438 P.2d 818, 821 (1968); New York Merchan-
dise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 827-28, 264 P.2d 863, 864 (1953).
15. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972) (holding that state
replevin statutes which permitted chattels to be taken from the defendant
prior to hearing violated due process clause); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (holding that pre-judgment garnishment prior to
hearing violates the due process clause).
16. See Haas v. Haas, 417 U.S. 928 (1974), dismissing appeal from 504
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visions in the Uniform Probate Code allowing informal probate
of a will without notice and the barring of decedents' creditors'
claims under a short-term nonclaim statute.17
A decade ago, then, it was doubtful whether the Supreme
Court would impose Mullane notice requirements on probate
proceedings. Nonetheless, in Tulsa Professional Collection
Services v. Pope,'8 the Court recently held that an Oklahoma
short-term nonclaim statute, which provided for notice only by
publication in most instances, violated the due process clause
when applied to the claims of "known or reasonably ascertain-
able creditors."'19
This Article proposes amendments to the Uniform Probate
Code's pre-Pope short-term nonclaim statutes. Part I explains
the immediate progenitors of the Pope decision and Pope itself.
Part II addresses the design of nonclaim statutes after Pope. It
explains the need to make short-term nonclaim statutes consis-
tent with Pope's due process requirements while minimizing
the adverse impact of these requirements on the barring of
creditors' claims and the efficient and economical administra-
tion of decedents' estates. Part III applies the discussion in
Part II and proposes amendments to nonclaim statutes of the
Uniform Probate Code.
I. POPE AND ITS IMMEDIATE PROGENITORS
The centerpiece of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion
in Pope is Texaco, Inc. v. Short,20 a 1982 decision involving an
Indiana statute of limitations popularly known as a "Mineral
Lapse Act."21 The Mineral Lapse Act provided that a "severed
mineral interest" lapsed, if not "used" for a twenty-year period,
unless the owner recorded a statement of claim.22 Owners
could protect their interests against this lapse by such a record-
S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1973); Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 393 U.S. 530 (1968), dis-
missing appeal from 151 Mont. 526, 445 P.2d 574 (1968).
17. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-301, 3-306 (1988); id. §§ 3-801, 3-803(a)(1).
Some commentators criticized the commissioners for including common form
probate and some other "no-notice" provisions, however. See, e.g., Note, The
Constitutionality of the No-Notice Provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, 60
MINN. L. REV. 317, 325-36 (1976).
18. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
19. Id. at 1347.
20. 454 U.S. 516 (1982), cited with approval in Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1348-
50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). Short was a consolidation of two cases. Id. at
521.
21. Id. at 518 (discussing IND. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to 11-8 (1976)).
22. Id. at 519.
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ing during the twenty-year period of nonuse or within two
years after the effective date of the statute, whichever came
later.2 3 Thus, owners who had not used their severed mineral
interests for twenty years on the date the statute became effec-
tive had only two years in which to preserve their interests by
such a recording.
24
The appellants in Short owned severed mineral interests,
but had not used them for twenty years when the Act became
effective and they failed to record the required statements of
claim within the two-year limitations period.25 The possessory
owner of the interests commenced an action to secure a declar-
atory judgment that appellants' interests had lapsed.26 The In-
diana Supreme Court reversed a lower court's holding in favor
of appellants, rejecting their argument that the Act could not
effect a lapse of their interests without providing notice and an
opportunity to be heard.27 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the Indiana judgment, stating:
Appellants ... claim that the absence of specific notice prior to the
lapse of a mineral right renders ineffective the self executing feature
of the Indiana statute. That claim has no greater force than a claim
that a self-executing statute of limitations is unconstitutional. The
Due Process Clause does not require a defendant to notify a plaintiff
that a statute of limitations is about to run, although it certainly
would preclude him from obtaining a declaratory judgment that his
adversary's claim is barred without giving notice of that proceeding.2 8
A year after Short, the Supreme Court decided Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams,29 a case involving a mortgagee of
record whose security interest in mortgaged premises had been
subordinated to the rights of a purchaser of the premises at a
tax foreclosure sale.30 The only notice of the sale given to the
appellant mortgagee was a notice posted in the county court-
house and published for three successive weeks.31 The Indiana
courts had held that the purchaser of the mortgaged premises
at the tax foreclosure sale took free of the lien of appellant's
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id. at 521.
26. Id
27. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 273 Ind. 518, 523, 406 N.E.2d 625 630-31 (1980),
aff'd 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
28. 454 U.S. at 536.
29. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
30. Indiana tax foreclosure statutes did not provide for notice either by
mail or by personal service to mortgagees of property subject to tax sales. Id





The Supreme Court reversed the Indiana court's decision,
holding that the due process clause entitled appellant, as a
mortgagee of record, to more than published notice of the sale.
The Court stated:
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly re-
corded, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by
notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known available address, or by
personal service. But unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifi-
able, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the mandate of
Mullane.
3 3
The Court found that although the mortgage on file with the
county recorder identified the mortgagee only as "MENNON-
ITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corporation, of Wayne County,
in the State of Ohio," the purchaser could have ascertained the
mortgagee's address through reasonably diligent efforts.34 The
Court also noted that "[s]imply mailing a letter to 'Mennonite
Board of Missions, Wayne County, Ohio,' quite likely would
have provided actual notice, given the well-known skill of pos-
tal officials and employ6s in making proper delivery of letters
defectively addressed.' ,35
Shortly after deciding Mennonite, the Court faced the ap-
peal of a decedent's creditor from the Nevada Supreme Court's
decision in Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley ("Moseley
I,,).36 In Moseley I, the Nevada court held that the published
notice provided under the state's short-term nonclaim statute
barred the claims of a known creditor of a decedent's estate.
3 7
The Supreme Court, in a cryptic memorandum opinion ("Mose-
ley II"),3s vacated the Nevada court's judgment and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Mennonite.3 9 On re-
mand, the Nevada Supreme Court, also in a per curiam opinion
32. Mennonite Bd. of Missions, Inc. v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686 (1981).
33. 462 U.S. at 798.
34. Id. at 798 n.4.
35. Id. (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1914)). The Court
noted, however, that a governmental body is not required to undertake ex-
traordinary efforts to discover the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee
whose identity is not in the public record. Id. at 798-99 n.4.
36. 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 479, 653 P.2d at 160-61.
38. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 120 (1983) (mem.).
39. The memorandum decision, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and the case remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791 (1983).
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("Moseley III"),40 determined that Mullane and Mennonite re-
quired at least mailed notice to known creditors.41 Academic
commentators promptly supplied due process arguments in sup-
port of the Nevada court's conclusion.4
Other state courts, however, did not follow the Nevada
Supreme Court's holding in Moseley III. The source of their
disagreement with Moseley III was Short. Commentators have
long considered nonclaim statutes to be statutes of limitations.
4 3
Courts in five states, including the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Pope held that nonclaim statutes were statutes of limitations
shielded from Mullane's notice requirements by Short.44 More-
over, another five states had previously rejected Mullane chal-
lenges to the validity of nonclaim statutes on various grounds,
including the proposition that Mullane was inapplicable to pro-
bate proceedings. 45 The Supreme Court's decision in Pope
therefore probably was needed to prevent Moseley III from be-
coming an aberration.
The Pope opinion rescued Moseley III in the following
passage:
Appellant's interest is an unsecured claim, a cause of action against
the estate for an unpaid bill. Little doubt remains that such an intan-
gible interest is property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment....
The Fourteenth Amendment protects this interest, however, only
from a deprivation by state action. Private use of state sanctioned pri-
vate remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state ac-
tion .... Nor is the State's involvement in the mere running of a
40. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 100 Nev. 337, 683 P.2d 20 (1984) (per
curiam).
41. Id at 338, 683 P.2d at 21.
42. Falender, supra note 9, at 678-81; Kuether, Is Kansas Probate Non
Claim Statute Unconstitutional?, 54 KAN. B.A.J. 115, 118 (1985).
43. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 127, at 689-92.
44. Coley v. Estate of Odom, 500 So.2d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Gibbs v. Estate of Dolan, 146 11. App. 3d 203, 209, 496 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (1986);
In re Estate of Madden, 11 Kan. App. 2d 540, 544, 729 P.2d 464, 467 (1986),
affl'd, 241 Kan. 414, 736 P.2d 940 (1987); Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan
Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. 1985); In re Estate of Pope, 733 P.2d 396, 400-01
(Okla. 1986).
45. See Baker Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 151 Mont. 526, 529, 445 P.2d 574,
576 (1968) (holding Mullane inapplicable to probate proceedings); see also
Brunell Leasing Corp. v. Wilkins, 11 Ariz. App. 165, 167, 462 P.2d 858, 860
(1969) (holding Mullane notice requirements inapplicable to nonclaim statute);
Chalaby v. Driskell, 237 Or. 245, 248, 390 P.2d 632, 633 (1964) (same); New
York Merchandise Co. v. Stout, 43 Wash. 2d 825, 827-28, 264 P.2d 863, 864
(1953) (same); In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 448, 302 N.W.2d 414, 420




general statute of limitation generally sufficient to implicate due pro-
cess. . . . The question here is whether the State's involvement with
the nonclaim statute is substantial enough to implicate the Due Pro-
cess Clause.
Appellee argues that it is not, contending that Oklahoma's non-
claim statute is a self-executing statute of limitations. Relying on this
characterization, appellee then points to Short.... Appellee's reading
of Short is correct-due process does not require that potential plain-
tiffs be given notice of the impending expiration of a period of limita-
tions-but in our view, appellee's premise is not. Oklahoma's
nonclaim statute is not a self-executing statute of limitations....
As we noted in Short, however, it is the "self-executing feature"
of a statute of limitations that makes Mullane and Mennonite inappo-
site.... The State's interest in a self-executing statute of limitations
is in providing repose for potential defendants and in avoiding stale
claims. The State has no role to play beyond enactment of the limita-
tions period. While this enactment obviously is state action, the
State's limited involvement in the running of the time period gener-
ally falls short of constituting the type of state action required to im-
plicate the protections of the Due Process Clause.
Here, in contrast, there is significant state action. The probate
court is intimately involved throughout, and without that involvement
the time bar is never activated. The nonclahn statute becomes opera-
tive only after probate proceedings have been commenced in state
court. The court must appoint the executor or executrix before no-
tice, which triggers the time bar, can be given....
Where the legal proceedings themselves trigger the time bar,
even if those proceedings do not necessarily resolve the claim on its
merits, the time bar lacks the self-executing feature that Short indi-
cated was necessary to remove any due process problem. Rather, in
such circumstances, due process is directly implicated and actual no-
tice generally is required.
4 6
This passage provides sufficient guidance for legislative re-
vision of short-term nonclaim statutes. It establishes that tradi-
tional statutes, which require a judicially appointed personal
representative to give creditors notice by publication, involve
sufficient state action to trigger Mullane notice requirements.
Read literally, the passage does not say that state action simi-
larly is involved when a subordinate court official-a registrar
rather than a judge-appoints a personal representative with a
duty to publish such notice in informal proceedings under the
Uniform Probate Code.4 7 Nothing else in the opinion, however,
supports such a narrow reading of Pope's state-action rationale.
Accordingly, legislative efforts to comply with Pope should as-
46. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1344-46
(1988).




sume that Mullane notice requirements apply to both formal
and informal proceedings.
Pope's state-action rationale is puzzling in an important re-
spect. The passage appears to accept Short, because it approves
self-executing statutes of limitations that serve "[t]he State's in-
terest ... in providing repose for defendants and in avoiding
stale claims. ' 48 It remains unclear, however, why a long-term
statute of limitations that bars a will contest a year or more af-
ter a court has admitted a will to probate without notice does
not similarly serve the same state interest, despite the state ac-
tion involved in admitting the will to probate.
4 9
The quoted passage declines to approve long-term5° non-
claim statutes that bar creditors' claims not asserted within a
year, or a longer period, after a decedent's death.5 1 Yet these
long-term statutes clearly appear to be self-executing statutes
of limitations such as those approved in Short, as Short is ex-
plained in Pope.5 2 Indeed, it seems relatively safe to assume
that these long-term nonclaim statutes are consistent with Mul-
lane and Mennonite, as qualified by Pope,53 because nothing in
the Pope opinion suggests a contrary conclusion.
II. DESIGNING NONCLAIM STATUTES AFTER POPE
A. THE ROLE OF NONCLAIM STATUTES
It is a fact familiar to probate lawyers that few creditors of
48. 108 S. Ct. at 1348.
49. Under the Code, an order admitting a will to informal probate without
notice becomes final either three years after the decedent's death or twelve
months after the informal probate, whichever is later. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-
302, 3-306, 3-108 (1988). See also id. § 3-1006 (prescribing ultimate time limit
for recovery against distributees).
50. This term is also Professor Falender's. Falender, supra note 9, at 667-
68.
51. The period is generally one to five years. For example, § 3-803(a)(2) of
the Code provides as follows:
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivi-
sion thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devi-
sees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(2) within [3] years after the decedent's death if notice to credi-
tors has not been published.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(a)(2) (1988).
52. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1345
(1988).
53. See id at 1345-48.
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decedents file claims, apparently because few need to do so to
secure payment. Professor Langbein has provided evidence of
this fact, together with the following explanations.54 (1) Survi-
vors pay the "vast majority" of decedents' debts quickly and
voluntarily, and creditors primarily rely on information volun-
tarily supplied by survivors for knowledge that their debtors
are deceased.55 (2) Health insurance generally pays for health
care indebtedness, and, of course, providers of health care to
terminal patients will know of patient deaths.56 (3) If survivors
refuse to pay a decedent's debts, creditors commonly hire bill
collectors to badger them.5 7 One reason the use of bill collec-
tors is successful is that a surviving spouse generally desires to
continue "doing business" with the decedent's creditors.5 8 (4)
Some creditors make extensive use of credit life insurance, pay-
able directly to the creditor, to satisfy claims.5 9 (5) Creditors
who finance "big ticket" purchases such as automobiles rely on
security interests to collect from decedents' estates or survivors,
and cases in which the value of the security is inadequate to
cover the debt are "relatively rare. '60 (6) The probate process,
involving filing claims and securing payment through adjudica-
tion if necessary, is too costly for general use-collection costs
would often exceed recoveries. 61 Langbein noted, however,
that creditors owed "debts of several thousand dollars," were
prepared to file claims if necessary.
62
The appellees in Pope used Langbein's evidence to support
their argument that "actual notice" to creditors of decedents
would burden estate administration much more than it would
54. Langbein introduced his evidence as follows:
Without mounting a systematic empirical study, I have tried to in-
quire broadly among credit officers and credit information specialists
and their lawyers. Among those I interviewed, I found unanimity
both on the central proposition that probate plays an inconsequential
role in the collection of decedents' debts, and on the reasons why.
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1120 (1984).
55. Id. at 1121.
56. Id at 1121-22.
57. Id at 1122.
58. Id. Another reason the use of bill collectors succeeds is that surviving
spouses are often jointly and severally liable to retail creditors on deceased
spouses' "joint" accounts. Id.
59. Id. at 1122-23.





assist creditors.63 Although this argument did not persuade the
Court, Langbein's basic proposition that "probate plays an in-
consequential role in the collection of decedents' debts" sim-
plifies compliance with the Pope decision. The requirement of
"actual notice" should be confined to those "known or reason-
ably ascertainable" creditors whose claims remain unpresented
or unpaid.
Although short-term statutes have not induced the filing of
many claims, they have contributed to prompt and efficient es-
tate settlement. These statutes have enabled personal repre-
sentatives to determine the aggregate amount of claims
promptly and at minimal cost, because estate creditors bear the
burden of learning of the decedent's death and of asserting
claims. 65 Thus short-term statutes typically have required that
creditors file claims within a period of two to six months fol-
lowing the date of publication of notice 66 to creditors or follow-
ing the date of a court's issuance of letters of administration to
a personal representative.
It is unclear whether the due process requirement of "ac-
tual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors"
67
will substantially delay determination of the aggregate amount
of claims. The impact of the due process requirement on the
promptness of this determination will depend on whether nu-
63. Brief for Appellee at 15-17, (No. 86-1961) Tulsa Professional Collection
Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
64. Langbein, supra note 54, at 1120.
65. The more quickly aggregate claims are determined, the more quickly
they can be paid or provided for, and the more quickly later tasks, such as the
payment of death taxes and distribution to successors, can be performed.
66. The required notice includes the information that the court has ap-
pointed a personal representative and that creditors should file claims within a
specified period. Falender, supra note 9, at 660-61 n.7. The specified period is
usually two to six months. Id. at 667. Some of these statutes start to run on
the date of publication of notice to creditors; some start to run upon the earlier
date that letters are issued to the personal representative. I&i at 668.
Some of these statutes bar claims in a much less "short term" than might
appear because they are coupled with other provisions which permit the late
filing of claims, for example, until the estate is ready for distribution. Under
the Minnesota mutation of Uniform Probate Code Section 3-803, certain speci-
fied claims, most health care expenses incurred during the decedent's last ill-
ness, for example, may be presented for payment up until the personal
representative has filed a petition for final settlement of the estate or a closing
statement. MNN. STAT. §§ 524.3-803(c)(3)(i), 524.3-715(18). Until such a peti-
tion is filed, the court may allow other claims on petition of the claimant "for
cause shown." Id, § 524.3-803(c)(3)(ii). For other examples of such provisions,
see Falender, supra note 9, at 670 n.49.
67. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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merous personal representatives will be led to continue their
search for unknown, but perhaps reasonably ascertainable, es-
tate creditors substantially beyond the old two- to six-month
nonclaim period. Depending on the extent of the required
search, this due process requirement may increase substantially
the time invested in searching for unknown creditors who
might be "reasonably ascertainable."
Long-term nonclaim statutes, those that start to run on the
death of the decedent and bar claims not asserted within one to
five years, create a different situation. Those that take several
years to run will leave successors exposed to creditors' claims a
good deal longer than the usual nonclaim period under short-
term statutes. Hence these long-term statutes provide some in-
centive for successors to seek administration under short-term
statutes and bar claims more quickly. Conversely, long-term
statutes that take no more than a year to run provide much less
incentive for successors to invoke short-term statutes. Indeed,
such long-term statutes may bar claims within the period com-
monly expended in administering an estate.
68
B. REVISING SHORT-TERM STATUTES
The goal of revising short-term statutes should be to effect
68. About fifteen years ago, Dean Robert Stein conducted a survey of the
administrations of decedents' estates opened in 1969 in four Minnesota coun-
ties, including the state's most populous county, Hennepin. See generally
Stein, Probate Administration Study: Some Emerging Conclusions, 9 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 596, 602 (1974). This study determined that, on the
average, even estates in the category for estates with the smallest value, those
involving less than $10,000 in probate assets, remained in administration for
about one and one-third years. Id. On the average, estates in the category for
estates with the largest value, those involving more than $200,000 in probate
assets, remained in administration for nearly three years. Id.
One might suppose that Minnesota's adoption of article 3 of the Uniform
Probate Code (with some modifications), which became effective in 1976, see
1976 Minn. Laws § 456, would have quickly changed this situation. To the con-
trary, however, the writer's informal inquiries to the Clerk of the Probate Di-
vision of the Hennepin County District Court in the summer of 1988 indicate
that the usual duration of an estate's administration is still between eighteen
months and two years, with large estates requiring up to three years. These
generalizations are qualified by two others, however. Again according to the
writer's informal inquiries, about five percent of Hennepin County estates are
confined to exempt property and administered in summary proceedings, often
completed within two months. A number of informally administered estates
are closed within a year.
Although the Minnesota experience is an uncertain guide to practices
elsewhere, it seems plausible to assume that, across the country, many estate
administrations still are not closed within a year after the decedent's death.
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compliance with Pope's "actual notice" requirement while mini-
mizing the negative impact of such compliance on prompt, effi-
cient, and economical estate settlement. The Supreme Court in
Pope disclaims any intention to impose notice requirements
that would interfere with these probate reform objectives. The
Court notes that "the State undeniably has a legitimate interest
in the expeditious resolution of probate proceedings."
69 Mul-
lane also disavowed any intent to require "impracticable and
extended searches... in the name of due process. ' 70 Moreover,
the Court indicated in Mennonite that all the executor or exec-
utrix need do is make "reasonably diligent efforts" to uncover
the identities of creditors.71 Additionally, the legislative histo-
ries of the many short-term statutes affected by Pope72 reflect
legislative judgments that these objectives of probate reform
are entitled to legislative priority and should be pursued for the
primary benefit of decedents' successors rather than decedents'
creditors.
73
The conclusion that legislatures should revise short-term
statutes for the primary benefit of successors rather than credi-
tors is significant because it excludes from consideration some
69. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347
(1988).
Death transforms the decedent's legal relationships and a State could
reasonably conclude that swift settlement of estates is so important
that it calls for very short time deadlines for filing claims. As noted,
the almost uniform practice is to establish such short deadlines, and
to provide only publication notice .... Providing actual notice to
known or reasonably ascertainable creditors, however, is not inconsis-
tent with the goals reflected in nonclaim statutes. Actual notice need
not be inefficient or burdensome. We have repeatedly recognized that
mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reason-
ably calculated to provide actual notice.
Id. at 1347.
70. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18
(1949).
71. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1982).
72. Professor Falender identified such statutes in more than 40 states.
Falender, supra note 9, at 660-61 n.7.
73. The Uniform Probate Code's basic provision stating the "general du-
ties" of a personal representative recognizes these legislative judgments:
A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated
and effective will and this Code, and as expeditiously and efficiently
as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the
authority conferred upon him by this Code, the terms of the will, if
any, and any order in proceedings to which he is party for the best
interests of successors to the estate.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-703(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Note that "successors,"
as defined by the Code, do not include creditors. See id. § 1-201(42).
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remedial legislation for which substantial precedent exists.
Louisiana statutes of civil-law origin permit successors to avoid
estate administration if they assume the decedent's debts.74 In
1982 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws added similar
provisions as an alternative available under the Uniform Pro-
bate Code.75 In 1983 they promulgated these Code provisions
as a separate Uniform Succession Without Administration
Act.76 No state has adopted these uniform laws, however. Pre-
sumably, a court would regard these civil-law based statutes as
consistent with due process. Neither these uniform laws nor
their Louisiana predecessors bar creditors' claims prematurely;
rather, they leave claims subject to the original "self-executing"
statutes of limitations applicable at the claims' inception.
77
Note that any legislatures which abandon short-term non-
claim statutes in favor of this civil-law approach will have
changed course significantly. In order to avoid administration
under this approach, successors must assume the burden of
identifying a decedent's creditors and satisfying their claims. In
contrast, short-term nonclaim statutes have placed the burden
74. Under Louisiana law, a successor may assume the decedent's debts
either unconditionally or with the benefit of inventory. By accepting uncondi-
tionally (termed "simple acceptance" in some statutes), the heir becomes liable
for the decedent's debts not only to the extent of the heir's share of the succes-
sion, but also personally. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1013 (West 1952); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3001 (West Supp. 1988); LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN.
art. 3031 (West 1961). If the successor accepts "with benefit of inventory," the
successor is liable for the decedent's debts only to the extent of the successor's
share. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1013 (West 1952); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
1423-1427 (West 1987). Acceptance of successions without administration is
covered generally by LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 3001-3062 (West 1961 &
Supp. 1988). For a general discussion of the Louisiana law governing accept-
ance of successions without administration, see L. OPPENHEIM, 10 LOUISIANA
CrVIL LAW TREATISE: SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS §§ 71-74, 77, 80 (1973)
(Supp. 1979). For a discussion of the advantages of this Louisiana system, see
Sarpy, Probate Economy and Celerity in Louisiana, 34 LA. L. REV. 523 (1973-
74).
Louisiana law also provides for administration of estates under some cir-
cumstances. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 3081-3395 (West 1961 & Supp.
1988).
75. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-312 to 3-322, 8 U.L.A. 256 (1983) (historical
note). In particular, note UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-312 (universal succession in
general), 3-321 (liability) and 3-322 (remedies of creditors) (1988).
76. See UNIF. SUCCESSION WITHOUT ADMIN. ACT § 101, 8A U.L.A. 156
(Supp. 1988).
77. Cf. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1345
(1988) (suggesting self-executing statutes of limitation are consistent with due
process because they involve no significant state action).
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upon creditors to ascertain that a debtor is deceased and to as-
sert claims against the estate.
Moreover, as other existing statutes demonstrate, legisla-
tures willing to place the burden of satisfying the claims of de-
cedents' creditors upon decedents' successors need not embrace
the civil-law approach to reach that result. Rather, they can
simply repeal their short-term nonclaim statutes. Georgia,
78
New Jersey,79 and New York"° have statutes that provide pre-
cedent for such a course of action. These statutes provide for
notice by publication to a decedent's creditors and for presenta-
tion and payment of claims during administration.8 1 Rather
than barring claims not so presented, these statutes permit
creditors who fail to present claims during administration to as-
sert the claims against the decedent's property following distri-
bution.82 These statutes protect successors against such post-
distribution creditors' claims only insofar as the personal repre-
sentative conducts a sufficient search for creditors at the ex-
pense of the estate.
8 3
Finally, controversies over late claims, such as the claim in-
volved in Pope, arise infrequently. This writer's recent inquir-
ies of Minnesota sources indicate that controversies over late
claims arise in fewer than five percent of estates.
8 4 If so, it
78. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-7-92, 53-7-95, 53-13-63 (1982).
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:22-4, 3B:22-9, 3B:22-40 (West 1983).
80. N.Y. SURI. CT. PROc. ACT LAW §§ 1801-02 (McKinney 1967); N.Y. EST.
PowERs & TRuSTS §§ 12-1.1, 12-12.1 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1988).
81. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-7-92 (1982).
82. See, e.g., id §§ 53-7-95, 53-13-103.
83. As with the civil-law-based legislation, it seems clear that these stat-
utes merely permit creditors' claims to be barred by self-executing statutes of
limitations that do not run afoul of Pope. See supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
84. Under Minnesota's variation of the Uniform Probate Code, late claims
may be allowed on several grounds, including "cause shown" for late filing,
until either a petition for final settlement or a closing statement is filed. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 524.3-803(c)(3)(i) to (ii), 524.3-715(18)(1988).
During the summer of 1988, the writer inquired of the clerk of the Pro-
bate Division of the Hennepin County District Court regarding the frequency
of contested hearings over late claims. This is a large, metropolitan probate
court in which substantially more than 4,000 decedents' estates usually are
under administration, and about 2,000 new estates are opened each year. Tele-
phone interview with Mary Hawkinson, Clerk of the Probate Division of the
District Court For the Fourth Judicial District (Hennepin County) (July 20,
1988). Data from the clerk's records suggested such contested hearings oc-
curred in about three percent of the estates under administration during the
year. Id
The Referee of the Probate Division of the Ramsey County Probate Court
guessed that contested hearings were held no more than twice a month in that
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surely would be inappropriate for legislatures to enact statutes
that burden many estates with costly searches for unknown
creditors that, save in a few instances, aren't there at all. Be-
cause the legislative objective in revising short-term statutes
should be to comply with Pope's notice requirements while pre-
serving past short-term statutes' contribution to efficient and
economical estate settlement for the primary benefit of succes-
sors, it is desirable to keep such costs of compliance within rea-
sonable bounds.
The next task is to examine Pope's general requirement of
"actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable credi-
tors."' 5 Some of the content of this requirement is clear. "Ac-
tual notice" means notice by at least ordinary first class mail.
8 6
Giving notice by mail to "known" creditors means giving notice
to those actually known.
8 7
The requirement that successors give notice to "reasonably
ascertainable creditors" cannot mean that a personal represen-
tative must give "actual notice" to a creditor at a time when the
creditor could be, but as yet is not, identified. Rather, the re-
quirement of "notice to... reasonably ascertainable creditors"
is a shorthand description of a two-step process: (1) the per-
sonal representative must search for unknown creditors who
are "reasonably ascertainable," and (2) the personal representa-
court. Telephone interview with John Allen, Referee of the Probate Division
of the District Court for the Second Judicial District (Ramsey County) (July
18, 1988). About 2,000 decedents' estates usually are under administration in
this court, and about 1,000 new estates are opened each year. Id.
The writer spoke to several Twin Cities probate lawyers with aggregate
experience of about 120 years in practice, and with the senior counsel of a
large Twin Cities corporate fiduciary which usually has about 50 good-sized or
larger estates under administration. None of these persons believed they en-
countered late claims in more than one in twenty estates. Telephone inter-
view with Robert L. Bullard, Member, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly (St.
Paul, Minn.) (July 15, 1988); telephone interview with John A. Forrest, Mem-
ber, Lindquist & Vennum (Minneapolis, Minn.) (July 18, 1988); telephone in-
terview with Larry W. Johnson, Member, Dorsey & Whitney (Minneapolis,
Minn.) (summer, 1988); interview with Gene C. Olson, Partner, Rider, Ben-
nett, Egan & Arundel (Minneapolis, Minn.) (July 19, 1988); telephone inter-
view with Honnen S. Weiss, member, Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt
(Minneapolis, Minn.) (July 15, 1988); telephone interview with Ann Hart
Werntz, Vice President and Senior Counsel, Norwest Corporation (Minneapo-
lis, Minn.) (July 20, 1988). All agreed that many of the late claims presented
were debts acknowledged by successors that had been overlooked and were
paid without objection. Id.
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
86. Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347
(1988); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1949).
87. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
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tive must give them notice after they are identified. Moreover,
the personal representative must conduct the search for un-
known creditors with reasonable diligence.
88
In some cases, the slim chance that unknown creditors ex-
ist presumably will render the task of conducting a "reasonably
diligent" search a manageable one. The personal representative
may be familiar with the decedent's debts and liabilities or con-
fident that available information on the subject, supplied by
others, is reliable. Often, the surviving spouse of the decedent
serves as personal representative and will be in this position. A
personal representative who served as the decedent's guardian
immediately prior to the decedent's death or managed the dece-
dent's financial affairs under a power of attorney should also be
in this position. Survivors of a decedent who was engaged in a
proprietorship or partnership business are likely to be familiar
with the liabilities of the business.
If the personal representative is troubled about the possi-
bility that the decedent had unknown creditors, however, the
requirement of "reasonable diligence" does not clearly limit the
scope of the search for creditors. No description of the require-
ments of a "reasonably diligent" search for creditors exists in
the post-Mennonite federal case law. Professor Falender8 9 ad-
vocates very thorough searches for creditors in the name of
"reasonable diligence," asserting that:
Reasonable diligence would include: a timely search of the decedent's
home, office, and safe deposit box; an investigation of the books and
records uncovered by the search, including the decedent's tax returns;
and an inquiry of those of the decedent's relatives, acquaintances,
business associates, and professional advisers whom the representa-
tive believes to be fertile sources of information. The concept of rea-
sonable diligence would charge the personal representative with the
actual knowledge of the decedent's heirs, devisees, and
acquaintances.
9 0
88. See id. As the Court indicated in Mennonite, all that the executor or
executrix need do is make "reasonably diligent efforts," 462 U.S., at 798, n.4,
... to uncover the identities of creditors. Id.
89. See Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1342 (citing Falender's article, Notice To Credi-
tors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due?, cited supra note 9).
90. Falender, supra note 9, at 695. Falender would impose substantial fi-
duciary duties on personal representatives, and legal duties of disclosure on
third persons with knowledge, to increase the effectiveness of searches for de-
cedents' creditors. Id. at 696.
The following passage from her article is instructive.
Theoretically, it... would be irrelevant whether the personal repre-
sentative began with any actual knowledge of the decedent's financial
affairs. Assuming that the personal representative uses reasonable
diligence in making inquiries and that the inquiries result in honest
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The case law this writer has found concerning "reasonably
diligent" searches involves searches required for heirs and next
of kin. For several reasons, however, these cases are dubious
guides to "reasonably diligent" searches for creditors. Some of
the cases requiring "reasonably diligent" searches for heirs are
escheat cases and courts in such cases hold the state must as-
sume the burden of proving the decedent died without heirs,91
sometimes recognizing a presumption that heirs survive the de-
cedent. 92 These rules plainly enhance the required search in
cases involving heirs and may have made sense under tradi-
tional intestate succession statutes which permit remote de-
scendants to inherit. Under such statutes, people are very
unlikely to die without heirs, although their remote heirs may
be unknown and difficult to find.93 In contrast, unknown credi-
tors probably are uncommon.
94
answers, the personal representative's ultimate knowledge should be
the same whether he began with much or little actual knowledge. In
practice, however, the actual knowledge of the personal representa-
tive may make a difference unless clear liability rules are developed
to ensure that the two preceding assumptions are as accurate as possi-
ble.
To ensure that personal representatives use reasonable diligence
in finding creditors, the personal representatives should be liable to
pay the claim of any creditor who should have been discovered, noti-
fied, and paid by the estate. This potential liability should assure rea-
sonable diligence on the part of any personal representative who is
aware of his duty of diligence. [The following footnote accompanies
the preceding sentence: "Professional personal representatives will
know about this duty; lay personal representatives may not. At the
time of appointment, the court should emphasize the importance of
all the fiduciary duties to the lay personal representative. Bonds
should become more important as creditor-related duties are in-
creased."]
To ensure that inquirees will respond honestly, dishonest or
nonresponsive inquirees also should be held liable to pay the claim of
any creditor who would have been discovered, notified, and paid by
the estate if the inquiree had responded to reasonable inquiry. This
liability rule may be called into play frequently by personal represent-
atives who are making inquiries and wish to impress upon the in-
quirees that an honest and complete response must be given. Because
those with knowledge are often those who will benefit financially by
not sharing it, liability rules must be developed to encourage honest
responses to the personal representative's reasonable inquiries; other-
wise, creditor notice rules could be avoided.
Falender, supra note 9, at 696-97.
91. T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 26, at 98.
92. 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 989, at 626 n.19 (Rohan
rev. ed. 1987); see, e.g., State v. Malhman, 386 S.W.2d 1, 4-6 (Mo. 1965).
93. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 7, § 18, at 26.
94. Of course, unknown creditors are not easy to count. It seems likely,
however, that most of those with claims worth pursuing will "show up" even-
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Another reason why cases involving searches for heirs or
next of kin do not supply guidelines for creditor searches is
that they rarely discuss searches in any detail. Moreover, some
of the sources of information they suggest lack apparent rele-
vance; others that seem helpful in searching for heirs are dubi-
ously applicable to searches for creditors. Consider, for
example, the following passage from the concurring opinion in
a Kansas case.
As evidence of diligence, the judge may consider whether such pri-
mary sources as the records of the county clerk, the county assessor,
the county treasurer, the register of deeds, the district court, and the
probate court, where applicable, have been examined, and whether
such secondary sources as the city, county or municipal directories of
the county where the decedent resided and his property is located
have been examined, to ascertain the names and addresses of the
heirs of the decedent. As further evidence of diligence, as applied to
the stipulated facts in this case, the judge should have ascertained
whether the tenant on the decedent's land during his life time, the
neighbors in the vicinity of the decedent's land, and the known heirs
of the decedent were examined to determine the names and addresses
of all of the heirs of the decedent.
95
One who is not familiar with the "records" of those public
offices listed in the first quoted sentence above as "primary
sources" of information about heirs simply cannot tell whether
those records are promising or merely possible sources. Ac-
cordingly, this listing sheds no light on a basic question in
searching both for heirs and for creditors-whether, in the
judge's view, a "reasonably diligent" search is limited to likely
sources of information. The second sentence quoted states that
the trial judge must determine whether a survivor asked ten-
ants of the decedent's land, neighbors in the land's vicinity, and
known heirs for information regarding the decedent's heirs.
"Known heirs" plainly would be promising sources of informa-
tion about other heirs. If the "tenant" and the "neighbors"
were friends of the decedent, they also would be at least plausi-
tually. The writer's current inquiries regarding the prevalence of late claims
in Minnesota suggest that such creditors are few in number. See supra note
84.
Under Minnesota law, creditors may file late claims "for cause shown" un-
til the personal representative has filed a petition for final settlement of the
estate or a closing statement. MINN. STAT. § 524.3-803(c)(3)(ii) (1988). The
writer's current inquiries also indicate that the likely duration of a Minnesota
estate administration is eighteen months to two years. See supra note 68.
Thus, creditors of Minnesota decedents may have nearly that long to file late
claims. The writer's inquiries indicate, however, that few late claims arise.
See supra note 84.
95. In re Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 522, 512 P.2d 387, 402 (1973).
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ble sources of such information. It does not seem likely, how-
ever, that these latter persons would have knowledge of the
decedent's creditors.
Thus the case law describing a "reasonably diligent" search
is limited, and the searches it involves are distinguishable from
the reasonably diligent search for a decedent's creditors de-
scribed in the Pope opinion. Moreover, these authorities re-
quire a more thorough search than Pope probably requires.
These conclusions are important to the design of revised short-
term statutes. They indicate it is not appropriate simply to di-
rect personal representatives to comply with Pope's general due
process standard of a "reasonably diligent" search for "ascer-
tainable" creditors. The Michigan Supreme Court observed a
generation ago that "[w]hatever the steps constituting reason-
able diligence may be, they will vary, with the circumstances,
from case to case." e96 Neither Mullane, Mennonite, Moseley III,
nor Pope itself supplies much useful guidance regarding the
steps this general due process standard requires of a personal
representative. Accordingly, it is likely that, if a statute im-
poses a duty to conduct a "reasonably diligent" search for "as-
certainable" creditors, personal representatives will tend to
respond by conducting rather extensive searches, impairing the
prompt and economical administration of estates while infre-
quently revealing additional creditors.
One way to minimize such searches would be to enact a
short-term nonclaim statute that required Mullane notice only
to known creditors whose claims remained unpresented and
unpaid. Such legislation could deal with unknown creditors,
who might or might not be "ascertainable," by giving personal
representatives discretion to decide whether a search for "as-
certainable" creditors is desirable, providing statutory stan-
dards that emphasize the successors' interests in prompt and
economical administration to govern personal representatives'
discretion. Under such legislation, personal representatives'
duty to conduct searches for unknown but "ascertainable" cred-
itors would be limited to a duty to exercise their discretion rea-
sonably-that is, to avoid an abuse of discretion.9 7 Of course,
96. Daft v. John And Elizabeth Whiteley Found., 363 Mich. 6, 11, 108
N.W.2d 893, 895 (1961) (en banc).
97. The legal effect of granting discretion to a fiduciary is addressed most
frequently in the common law of trusts, in which the basic principles gov-
erning interpretation of discretionary powers conferred upon a trustee by the




such a short-term nonclaim statute would retain the general re-
quirement of notice by publication, to bar unknown creditors
who are not "ascertainable." Creditors barred by such a statute
would include those barred by publication, plus those known to
the personal representative and hence given "actual notice" by
mail or personal service.
C. REVISING LONG-TERM STATUTES
Under the revised short-term statutes proposed in the pre-
ceding paragraph, some "ascertainable" creditors may not be-
come known and thus will not receive the "actual notice"
required by Pope. If courts are to bar such creditors' claims in
the interests of prompt and economical estate settlement,
courts must rely on long-term statutes, which run from a dece-
dent's death and currently bar claims not asserted within one
to five years thereafter.98
Although the Pope opinion does not state whether long-
term statutes satisfy due process requirements, 99 they appear to
be self-executing statutes of limitations, which the Court ap-
proved in Short. These long-term statutes serve the state's in-
terest "in providing repose for potential defendants and in
avoiding stale claims," and the Pope opinion approved this in-
terest as the legitimate role of self-executing statutes of limita-
tions.'00 If they are appropriately to supplement the proposed
revised short-term statutes, however, long-term statutes should
To the extent.., the trustee has discretion, the court will not control
his exercise of it as long as he does not exceed the limits of the discre-
tion conferred upon him. The court will not substitute its own judg-
ment for his. Even where the trustee has discretion, however, the
court will not permit him to abuse the discretion. This ordinarily
means that so long as he acts not only in good faith and from proper
motives, but also within the bounds of a reasonable judgment, the
court will not interfere; but the court will interfere when he acts
outside the bounds of a reasonable judgment.
III A. ScOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 187, at 14-15 (4th ed. 1988). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959) (court will not interfere with a
trustee's discretion, except to prevent an abuse).
Courts also have applied this basic doctrine in interpreting provisions of a
will granting discretion to a personal representative. 6 W. BOWE & D. PARKER,
PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 59.5, at 394 (1962 ed.). This doctrine should be
equally applicable to a statutory grant of discretion to a personal
representative.
98. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text.




bar creditors within the usual period of time required for estate
administration.
Any creditor of a decedent whose claim remains enforcea-
ble under the general statute of limitations that applied before
the debtor's death may argue that the claim is not barred by
the running of a revised short-term statute because he was a
"known" or "ascertainable" creditor who had not received "ac-
tual notice," and that publication could not bar the claim con-
sistently with due process. If a creditor asserts such a claim
during administration, the personal representative will be in a
good position to present any available defenses, with access to
the decedent's records, those of the estate, and other pertinent
information. For example, the personal representative might
assert that the claim was excessive or was invalid, that the re-
vised short-term statute barred the claim because the creditor
received "actual notice," or that the creditor was neither
"known" nor "reasonably ascertainable." If the personal repre-
sentative knows that the applicable long-term statute will run
before the estate is closed, no possibility that such a claimant
will appear later will cause the representative to conduct an ex-
cessive search for possibly "ascertainable" creditors.
As will be apparent to a well-advised personal representa-
tive, on the other hand, if creditors may assert such a claim
against successors long after the estate is distributed and closed
and the personal representative has been discharged, the suc-
cessors will be in a relatively poor position to assert the same
defenses. It may be difficult or impossible to secure pertinent
records and other information. Thus, creditors may be more
successful in establishing claims against successors than in as-
serting claims earlier against personal representatives. At the
least, successors will incur increased litigation costs in resisting
such claims. Moreover, if a personal representative knows the
applicable long-term statute will not run until after the estate
is closed, the representative may modify the administration to
protect successors against the assertion of such claims. The
personal representative's simplest solution may be to postpone
distribution and closing of the estate until the long-term statute
runs, if this would not delay distribution for an unacceptable
period. Otherwise, the representative may conduct an excessive
search for creditors at estate expense, to guard against the as-
sertion of claims after distribution and closing of the estate. If
the personal representatives follows either course, prompt and
efficient estate administration will be compromised.
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If the Pope opinion did not rest on a "state-action" ration-
ale,10 legislatures could revise long-term statutes simply to bar
all claims against successors following distribution. Such stat-
utes would protect successors and might encourage personal
representatives to complete administration more promptly.
Moreover, such a statute would allow creditors not barred by a
revised short-term statute to assert claims throughout the pe-
riod of administration. Under Pope's "state-action" rationale,
however, it is difficult to argue that a long-term statute that re-
lies on an estate distribution supervised by a court to bar claims
is a "self-executing statute of limitations."'10 2
101. See Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1345 (holding probate court's involvement in ap-
pointing executor, which is necessary to trigger time bar of short-term non-
claim state, constitutes state action).
102. The negative implications of the state-action rationale, however, are
unreliable; it is unwise to assume the Court would approve a two-month non-
claim statute resembling the Oklahoma statute in Pope, but under which the
period runs from the decedent's death rather than from the date notice is pub-
lished following commencement of probate proceedings. In Pope, the Court
distinguished Short on the ground that the "self-executing statute of limita-
tions" in the earlier case did not involve sufficient "state action" to trigger the
protections of the due process clause. See Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1345. In Short,
however, the complaining owner of unused mineral interests was given less no-
tice (in fact, none) under the "self-executing statute of limitations" in the Indi-
ana Mineral Lapse Act than the published notice given the decedent's
creditors by the Oklahoma statute in Pope. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516, 521-22 (1981). Were the Court to decide that short-term nonclaim statutes
could be made self-executing and thereby made constitutionally sound, it
would be endorsing statutes that provide estate creditors with less notice than
the publication notice rejected in Pope as a denial of due process. Such a re-
sult seems very unlikely.
The outcomes of state action cases in fact do not vary in close correspon-
dence with the amount of state action involved. The fact that a short-term
statute appears to be just as "self-executing" as the statute of limitations in
Short provides no assurance that the Court would deem the statute consistent
with due process for want of state action. Note, for example, the limited state
action involved in the famous racial covenant cases, Shelley v. Kramer, 334
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racial restrictive cove-
nant constitutes state action), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 239, 254 (1953)
(extending Shelley v. Kramer to find judicial enforcement of such a covenant
through an action for damages against co-covenantor constitutes state action).
A recent treatise puts this point as follows:
The Supreme Court's decisions on state action reflect how the judicial
balancing of rights functions to sort out those private activities whose
collision with other rights makes them constitutionally infirm. While
the balancing has nothing to do with finding a minimum quantum of
state activity, the process of sorting out proscribed activities has oc-
curred under the guise of a formulistic search for an undefined mini-
mum amount of state acts. In practice, when the challenged practice
deserved state protection the Court has ruled that state action is lack-
ing, declaring in effect that the practice is compatible with the four-
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The solution therefore is to employ a long-term statute
that bars creditors' claims in traditional fashion-on the expira-
tion of a period of time following a decedent's death, selecting a
period that is both reasonably respectful of creditor interests
and likely to expire before an estate is ready for distribution.
Precedent exists to support a one-year period, 0 3 and it seems
reasonable to require that creditors assert claims against a dece-
dent within a year after the decedent's death. In addition, solid
evidence suggests that most administered estates are not ready
for distribution within a year after the decedent's death despite
the availability of informal proceedings, at least under the Min-
nesota version of the Uniform Probate Code.10 4 Accordingly,
legislatures should supplement the proposed revised short-term
statutes with a one-year long-term statute.
III. SOME PROPOSED STATUTES
The following provisions are proposed amendments to the
Uniform Probate Code.10 5 Language that would amend existing
Code provisions is italicized. Drafting has been simplified by
separating amendments to be applied to "future" estate admin-
istration proceedings from those to be applied to "past" admin-
teenth amendment. When the harm to protected rights outweighed
the value of the challenged practice, the Court has found sufficient
state action, which made easy a final ruling of unconstitutionality.
2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.5, at 196-97 (1986).
103. The Colorado legislature, in enacting its version of Uniform Probate
Code Section 3-803, reduced the suggested three-year long-term nonclaim pe-
riod after the decedent's death to one year. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-803
(1987). As of October 1988, the California Law Revision Commission had
before it a tentative recommendation proposing "a new long term statute of
limitations of one year commencing with the decedent's death." CALIFORNIA
LAW REVISION COMM'N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO PROBATE
LAW AND PROCEDURE 3 (1988). Under this recommendation, Subdivision (b) of
Section 353 of the California Code of Civil Procedure would be amended to
read as follows:
(b) Except as provided in subdivisions (c) and (d), if a person against
whom an action may be brought dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action sur-
vives, an action may be commenced within one year after the date of
death, and the time otherwise limited for the commencement of the
action does not apply.
Id. at 4 (amending language italicized). Subdivisions (c) and (d) provide for ac-
tions against decedents dying before the effective date of Subdivision (b). Id.
104. See supra note 68.
105. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws doubtless will draft their
own in due course. The Code is a convenient vehicle for any proposal, how-
ever, because at least 14 states have adopted local versions of it.
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istration proceedings subject to Pope. It is convenient to make
Code Sections 3-801 and 3-803, as amended, applicable to the ad-
ministration of estates of decedents who die after these provi-
sions become law.
A. AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM PROBATE CODE SECTIONS 3-801
AND 3-803-FUTURE DECEDENTS
Section 3-801, concerning Notice to Creditors, should be
amended to read as follows:
10 6
Section 3-801A. [Notice to Creditors]
(a) Unless notice has already been given under this section, a per-
sonal representative upon his appointment shall publish a notice once
a week for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the [county] announcing his appointment and address and notifying
creditors of the estate to present their claims within 4 months after
the date of the first publication of the notice or be forever barred un-
less they are entitled to further service of notice pursuant to this
section.
(b) Within 3 months after the date of the first publication of the
notice, the personal representative shall determine, in the personal
representative's discretion: (i) what action is necessary to conduct a
reasonably diligent search for creditors of the decedent who are either
not known or not identified, and (ii) whether such a reasonably dili-
gent search can be conducted without either substantially increasing
costs of administration or substantially delaying distribution of the
estate. If the personal representative determines that such a search
can be so conducted, the personal representative shall conduct the
search. If the personal representative does not so determine, the per-
sonal representative shall not conduct the search. Under this section,
a creditor is "known" if: (i) the personal representative knows that
the creditor has asserted a claim that arose during the decedent's life
against either the decedent or the decedent's estate; or (ii) the creditor
has so asserted such a claim and the fact is clearly disclosed in acces-
sible financial records known and available to the personal represen-
tative. Under this section, a creditor is "identified" if the personal
representative's knowledge of the name and address of the creditor
permits service of notice to be made pursuant to paragraph (c).
(c) Three months after the date of the first publication of the no-
tice, the personal representative shall serve a copy of the notice on
each creditor of the decedent who is then known to the personal repre-
sentative and is then identified (except any creditor whose claim has
been either presented to the personal representative or paid), either by
delivery of a copy of the notice to the creditor personally, or by mail-
ing a copy of the notice to the creditor by certified, registered, or ordi-
nary first class mail addressed to the creditor at the creditor's office
or place of residence.
106. As amended, these sections are numbered 3-801A and 3-803A.
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Section 3-803, concerning limitations on presentation of
claims, should be amended to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 3-803A. [Limitations on Presentation of Claims]
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivi-
sion thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devi-
sees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) in the case of a creditor who is entitled, under the United
States Constitution, to notice only by publication under section 3-
801A, within 4 months after the date of the first publication of notice
to creditors if notice is given in compliance with Section 3-801A; pro-
vided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domi-
cile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barred
in this state;
(2) in the case of a creditor who was served with notice under
paragraph (c) of Section 3-801A, within 4 months after the date of the
first publication of notice to creditors or one month after such service,
whichever expires later;
(3) within one year after the decedent's death whether or not no-
tice to creditors has been published or served pursuant to Section 3-
801A.
An effective date provision for these amendments might
read as follows:
Sections 3-801A and 3-803A shall apply to the estates of decedents
who die after the date this Act becomes effective.
B. AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM PROBATE CODE SECTIONS 3-801
AND 3-803-PAST DECEDENTS
The preceding proposed amendments apply only to estates
of decedents who die after the amendments' adoption. The sec-
tions must be further amended to apply to the estates of past
decedents-those who died on or before the effective date of
the proposed amendments. Because some of these decedents
will have died shortly before the amendments' effective date, it
is necessary to require personal representatives of their estates
to give creditors the traditional published notice. Similarly,
personal representatives of these estates should give actual,
Mullane notice to known creditors who remain unbarred, have
not received such notice, have not presented claims, and remain
unpaid.
On turning to the subject of barring ascertainable creditors
of past decedents, however, one quickly discovers that the re-
maining need to give notice varies widely from case to case. To
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illustrate the varied need for further notice to ascertainable
creditors of these estates, consider a situation in which the de-
cedent dies shortly before the effective date of the proposed
amendments and survivors make no pre-enactment efforts to
satisfy creditors' claims. For example, suppose the decedent
dies on the date the proposed amendments become effective.
The need to conduct a reasonably diligent search to bar ascer-
tainable creditors in such a situation surely will be the same as
if the decedent had died a day later.
Consider a contrasting situation in which the decedent died
and the estate was distributed thirty-seven and thirteen
months, respectively, before the effective date of the proposed
amendments to Code sections 3-801 and 3-803. Further assume
that the decedent's personal representative filed a closing state-
ment ten months before that date. Assume also that the Code
became effective in the jurisdiction prior to the decedent's
death. In such a situation, the Code's long-term statutes would
usually prevent any creditor of the decedent from proceeding
against either the personal representative or the distributees of
the estate after the proposed amendments became law. 0 7 If so,
no former personal representative or distributee of such an es-
tate should conduct a further search for ascertainable creditors.
Another source of diversity among the estates of past dece-
dents is the likely availability of a self-help remedy for per-
sonal representatives. In a pre-Mullane decision, American
Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C, L08 the Supreme Court stated that a
litigant who has received actual notice, but brings a suit alleg-
ing that a statute violates the due process clause because it does
not require such notice, has suffered no injury and therefore
lacks standing to assert the statutory defect.'0 9 Thus, since
Moseley III, informed personal representatives seeking to bar
known and ascertainable creditors' claims have had the oppor-
107. Under Code section 3-803(a)(2), if notice to creditors has not been pub-
lished, creditors' claims are barred unless presented within three years after
the decedent's death. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803 (1988). Under section 3-108,
no proceeding to appoint a personal representative can be commenced more
than three years after the decedent's death, with a few exceptions. Id. § 3-108.
Section 3-1005 bars actions by creditors against a personal representative for
breach of fiduciary duty unless commenced within six months after the filing
of a closing statement. Sections 3-1004 and 3-1006 bar creditors from proceed-
ing against distributees more than three years after the decedent's death or
one year after distribution, whichever comes later, with a few exceptions. Id.
§§ 3-1004, 3-1006.
108. 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
109. I& at 107.
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tunity to conduct a search and to give actual notice to creditors
when appropriate.11 0 Furthermore, it is apparent that this op-
portunity to comply with Pope's notice requirements, in ad-
vance of remedial legislation, has been available since the Court
rendered the decision. Because of American Power, those es-
tates of past decedents that have used this self-help remedy
may have no need for recourse to remedial legislation.
Although the Pope decision clearly applies to estates of
many past decedents, it is inapplicable to some others and un-
certainty therefore may exist as to whether Pope applies to a
given estate. The issue is whether, on particular facts, a court
will limit Pope's due process requirements to prospective appli-
cation or give them retroactive effect. This uncertainty easily
could lead to complex remedial legislation. The simple ap-
proach proposed here is to give personal representatives of past
estates discretion to choose between: (i) making a further ef-
fort to bar creditors under a short-term statute and (ii) settling
for a later bar under an applicable long-term statute or original
statute of limitations.
The leading case limiting the retroactive applicability of
Supreme Court decisions is Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.111 In
Chevron, the Court stated that three factors should be consid-
ered in determining whether a decision should be given only
prospective effect.
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been
stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case
by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its
operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retro-
active application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample
basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding
of nonretroactivity.
' 1 12
In Pope, the Supreme Court's opinion itself suggests the
decision is applicable to the estates of decedents who died
before the decision was rendered; the decedent in the case died
110. One Minnesota probate lawyer has advised the writer that, after Mose-
ley HI and before Pope, he presented this option to personal representatives
who were his clients. Interview with Jerry G. Dygert, member, Dygert Law
Office (Minneapolis, Minn., date unavailable) (1988).
111. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
112. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 73:763
DECEDENTS' CREDITORS
in 1979 and the Court applied its decision to his estate.
Although the appellee did not argue that the rule be given only
prospective application, the Court could have asked the parties
to address the issue or reserved the question and remanded the
case to the Oklahoma courts, directing them to address it.
Arguably, Pope failed the first prong of the Chevron test
for limiting retroactive application. The Nevada Supreme
Court's decision in Moseley 111113 expresses its view that the re-
sult in Pope was "clearly foreshadowed" by the United States
Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Moseley 11,114 and it is
hard to argue that the Nevada court erred. It is true that sev-
eral state appellate decisions preceding Pope relied on Short to
conclude that Moseley III was incorrectly decided.1 15 Arguably,
however, prior cases can "clearly foreshadow" a result they
support, despite the existence of substantial authority for the
contrary result.
1 6
Pope may have failed the Chevron test's second prong as
well. In Moseley II, the United States Supreme Court arguably
demonstrated its desire to advance the cause of due process no-
tice by applying Mennonite to short-term nonclaim statutes un-
less the Nevada court concluded, on remand, that a good reason
counseled against doing so.137 Pope surely decided that no such
good reason existed.
Finally, Pope may have failed the third prong of the Chev-
ron test. The published opinions in Pope do not suggest the
Pope estate's beneficiaries would suffer significant injustice or
hardship if required to pay the appellant's claim. The appel-
lee's brief in the Supreme Court indicates the executrix first
became aware of the creditor's claim more than a year after the
decedent's 1979 death, although suit to enforce the claim was
commenced several years later. 1 8 A dissenting opinion in the
Oklahoma Supreme Court indicates the Pope estate was still
open in 1986 when the claimant filed its brief in that court.119
113. Moseley III, 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984) (per curiam).
114. See id at 71, 683 P.2d at 21.
115. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
116. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently provided support
for such a view when it relied on Chevron to apply Mennonite, a six to three
decision, retroactively. Verba v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 811, 816-17
(6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting nonretroactive application of Mennonite because it
did not create a principle of law but merely extended Mullane).
117. See Moseley II, 463 U.S. 1202 (1982).
118. See Appellee's Brief at 2, Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope,
108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988) (No. 86-1961).
119. "[W]e know that 'this estate, however,... is still pending and is sol-
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Accordingly, the apparent message of Pope is that, except
in cases in which "substantial inequitable results" would likely
follow, estates of decedents that were open when the Court
rendered its decision are subject to Pope's notice requirements,
unless the bar of a long-term statute applies.
120
Now consider whether estates of decedents that were
closed when the Court decided Pope present the same problem.
Arguably, they do not. First, if a court applies Pope's notice re-
quirements to such estates, the discharged personal representa-
tives of those estates might be held liable to "reasonably
ascertainable" but unknown creditors despite the absence, dur-
ing administration, of any explicit statutory duty to give those
creditors Mullane notice. Such creditors could argue that the
personal representative's general duty to administer the estate
with reasonable diligence included the duty to give such no-
tice.12 ' Second, if a court applies Pope to such estates, it might
hold their distributees liable to creditors despite their reliance
on the distribution in disposing of distributed funds. These con-
sequences might well be "substantial inequitable results," justi-
fying a holding of nonretroactivity under the third prong of the
Chevron test.
Enough marginal uncertainty thus exists regarding the ret-
roactive applicability of Pope, at least to estates closed when the
Supreme Court decided Pope, that remedial legislation should
afford personal representatives some discretion regarding the
need for further efforts to search for ascertainable creditors.
The following provisions are proposed amendments to Uni-
form Probate Code sections 3-801 and 3-803 for application to
past decedents' estates. As amended, these sections are num-
bered 3-801B and 3-803B.
Section 3-801B. [Notice to Creditors]
(a) Unless notice has already been given under Section 3-801 or
this paragraph, a personal representative shall upon the later of his
appointment or the effective date of this paragraph, publish a notice
once a week for 3 successive weeks in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the [county] announcing his appointment and address and noti-
fying creditors of the estate to present their claims within 4 months
vent so that a delay in ... closing ... is not an issue'." In re Estate of Pope,
733 P.2d 396, 404 (Okla. 1986) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
120. A case likely to fall within the exception would be one in which an
authorized final distribution preceded the Pope decision.
121. If a court accepted this argument, remedial legislation might not re-
lieve a personal representative of the resulting liability, for the court might




after the date of the first publication of the notice or be forever
barred unless they are entitled to further service of notice pursuant to
this section.
(b) If a personal representative is empowered to act at any time
within 4 months after the effective date of this section, the personal
representative shall forthwith determine, in the personal representa-
tive's discretion. (i) what action is necessary to conduct a reasonably
diligent search for creditors of the decedent who are either not known
or not identified, and, (ii) whether it is appropriate to conduct such a
reasonably diligent search. If the personal representative determines
that such a search is appropriate, the personal representative shall
conduct the search. If the personal representative does not so deter-
mine, the personal representative shall not conduct the search. Under
this section, a creditor is "known" if (i) the personal representative
knows that the creditor has asserted a claim that arose during the de-
cedent's life against either the decedent or the decedent's estate; or (ii)
the creditor has so asserted such a claim and the fact is clearly dis-
closed in accessible financial records known and available to the per-
sonal representative. Under this section, a creditor is "identijied" if
the personal representative's knowledge of the name and address of
the creditor will permit service of notice to be made pursuant to para-
graph (c). Discretion conferred on the personal representative under
this paragraph shall be exercised in accord with the general duties im-
posed upon personal representatives by Section 3-703(a).
(c) If a personal representative is empowered to act at any time
within 4 months after the effective date of this section, the personal
representative shall, on the completion of his or her duties under par-
agraph (b), give notice to any creditor of the decedent then known to
the personal representative and then identified, excepting any credi-
tor: (i) whose claim is barred; (ii) who has been given such notice;
(iii) whose claim has been presented or (iv) whose claim has been
paid. The notice shall announce the personal representative's ap-
pointment and address and shall notify each such creditor to present
any claim within one month after the date of the service of the notice
on the creditor or be forever barred. The personal representative shall
serve a copy of the notice upon each such creditor, either by delivery
of a copy of the notice to the creditor personally, or by mailing a copy
of the notice to the creditor by certified, registered, or ordinary first-
class mail addressed to the creditor at the creditor's office or place of
residence.
Section 3-803, regarding limitations on presentation of
claims, should be amended to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 3-803B. [Limitations on Presentation of Claims]
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivi-
sion thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devi-
sees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(1) in the case of a creditor who was entitled, under the United States
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Constitution, to notice only by publication under section 3-801 or 3-
801B, within 4 months after the date of the first publication of notice
to creditors if notice is given in compliance with Section 3-801 or 3-
801B; provided, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the dece-
dent's domicile before the first publication for claims in this state are
also barred in this state;
(2) in the case of a creditor who was served with notice under para-
graph (c) of Section 3-801B, within 4 months after the effective date
of Section 3-801B or one month after such service, whichever comes
later;
(3) within one year after the effective date of this section or any ap-
plicable period of limitations under sections 3-108, 3-803, 3-1005, or 3-
1006, whichever expires first.
An effective date provision for these amendments might
read as follows:
Sections 3-801B and 3-803B shall apply to the estates of decedents who
died on or before the date this Act became effective.
The proposed statutes that apply to past decedents's es-
tates, sections 3-801B and 3-803B, differ from those that apply
to future decedents' estates, sections 3-801A and 3-803A,122 in
the following basic respects. First, the periods of limitations in
the statutes that apply to past decedents run, in part, from the
effective date of those provisions. Second, in section 3-801B, the
personal representative is given broader discretion to decide
whether to search for unknown or unidentified creditors, be-
cause these provisions will apply to a wide variety of past es-
tates. Third, section 3-803B(a)(3) permits the one-year period
of this long-term nonclaim statute to reduce the period of limi-
tations applicable to pre-existing claims against such past dece-
dents. It seems clear this provision is constitutionally
permissible. 123 The provision is also desirable, because it will
relieve past decedents' estates of concern over unknown credi-
122. See supra Part III(A).
123. Under this provision, the claim of a past decedent's creditor will be
barred, at the latest, one year after the effective date of section 3-803B. Note
that on the decedent's death, for example, a week before that effective date,
the creditor's claim would not be barred, absent publication of notice to credi-
tors for nearly three years. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-803(a)(2) (1988).
Although this shortens the period of the statute of limitations on a pre-ex-
isting claim, it is constitutionally permissible because an aggregate period of at
least one year following a past decedent's death provides past decedents' credi-
tors a reasonable opportunity to assert their rights. See Chase Securities Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314-16 (1944) (noting statutes of limitation involve
remedial matters and not destruction of fundamental rights); Terry v. Ander-
son, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877) (stating statutes of limitation affecting existing
rights are constitutional if reasonable time is allowed to bring affected ac-
tions); 2 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 102, § 15.9, at 111-12
(discussing Chase Securities Corp.).
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tors' claims within a period similar to that applicable to future
decedents' estates under section 3-803A(a)(3).
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding Mullane's eloquent description of the no-
tice requirements of the due process clause, current doctrine
exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Pope does little
more than make clear that a decedent's known creditors must
be given actual Mullane notice that a short-term nonclaim stat-
ute has begun to run, if the statute is to bar their claims con-
sistently with due process.
Thus, while the Pope opinion declares that "[p]roviding ac-
tual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors.., is
not inconsistent with the goals reflected in nonclaim stat-
utes,"1 24 the standards said to govern the required search for
unknown but "ascertainable" creditors of decedents are con-
fined to rather general dicta from earlier decisions in cases in
which the court did not define the scope of the required search.
The Pope opinion reiterates the Court's denial in Mullane of
"'any intent to require 'impracticable and extended searches...
in the name of due process.' "125 The opinion also quotes from
Mennonite in the following passage: "[A]ll that the executor or
executrix need do is make 'reasonably diligent efforts,' to un-
cover the identities of creditors."' 2 6 The Court also advises
that, "[flor creditors who are not 'reasonably ascertainable,'
publication notice can suffice.' 27 The Court then states that,
"[h]ere, as in Mullane, it is reasonable to dispense with actual
notice to those with mere 'conjectural' claims.' 128
Accordingly, pending further light from the Court, the pru-
dent course to follow is that indicated in this Article's proposed
amendments to Uniform Probate Code sections 3-801 and 3-
803-to require Mullane notice to known creditors of decedents
and to give personal representatives discretion in searching for
"reasonably ascertainable" creditors, under standards that em-
phasize state interests in prompt and economical estate
settlement.
Of course, personal representatives operating under such
statutory standards may fail to conduct the required search for
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some "ascertainable" creditors. Nonetheless, these standards
will minimize undue expense and delay in searching for "ascer-
tainable" creditors who may not exist.
